“Wealth taxes raise much less revenue than projected.”
Annual taxes on net wealth have been abolished in most of the OECD countries that once had them, often after disappointing revenue. Their proponents argue that past failures came from bad design: low thresholds, many exemptions, and easy escape abroad. They say a modern tax with few exemptions, good third-party reporting and an exit tax would raise substantial sums.
The disagreement is about behavioural responses. When wealth is taxed, how much do the rich move, hide, reclassify or under-report their assets? Swiss and Danish data show large responses; supporters argue these reflect features that a well-designed tax would avoid.
An annual tax on an individual's net wealth above a threshold, as in Switzerland, Norway and Spain, or proposed by Saez and Zucman. One-off wealth levies and property taxes are different.
Static revenue estimates that assume little behavioural response, compared with what is actually collected.
Swiss data show reported wealth responds strongly to wealth-tax rates, far more than income responds to income taxes, meaning revenue falls well short of static projections.
Brülhart and colleagues found that a 1 percentage point cut in the wealth tax rate raises reported taxable wealth by at least 43% after six years; around a quarter of the effect came from people moving between cantons, and much of the rest likely from under-reporting.
Brülhart, Gruber, Krapf & Schmidheiny (2022). Behavioral Responses to Wealth Taxes: Evidence from Switzerland. AEJ: Economic Policy, 14(4), 111–150.
Limitation
Moving between Swiss cantons is far easier than leaving a country. Under-reporting reflects the absence of third-party reporting of financial wealth, which can be fixed.
Most OECD countries that had wealth taxes abolished them, citing low revenue, high administrative costs and capital flight.
The number of OECD countries with net wealth taxes fell from 12 in 1990 to 4 in 2017. Where they existed, they typically raised well under 1% of tax revenue.
OECD (2018). The Role and Design of Net Wealth Taxes in the OECD. OECD Tax Policy Studies No. 26.
Limitation
Many abolitions followed lobbying and ideological shifts, not just revenue problems. Switzerland's wealth tax raises over 1% of GDP.
When Norway raised its wealth tax in 2022, dozens of its richest residents moved to Switzerland, taking their future tax base with them.
Norwegian media and government data documented a record number of wealthy individuals relocating abroad in 2022–2023 after the wealth-tax increase, including several billionaires; Norway's government estimated the departures cost substantial future revenue.
Reported by Reuters and Financial Times, 2023; Norwegian Ministry of Finance statements.
Limitation
Norway's wealth tax still raises significant revenue overall, and an exit tax was tightened in response.
Behavioural responses depend on design. A wealth tax with a high threshold, no exemptions, mandatory third-party reporting and a strong exit tax would face much smaller avoidance than historical European taxes.
Saez and Zucman estimated their proposed US wealth tax (2% above $50 million, 3% above $1 billion) would raise about $2.75 trillion over ten years, assuming an evasion rate of around 15% under strong enforcement.
Saez & Zucman (2019). Progressive Wealth Taxation. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2019, 437–533.
Limitation
Summers and Sarin argued that experience with the US estate tax suggests far lower revenue; the debate on the right avoidance assumption is unresolved.
Switzerland shows a wealth tax can raise meaningful revenue durably: it is one of the oldest and still raises more as a share of GDP than many countries' corporate taxes.
Swiss cantonal wealth taxes raise over 1% of GDP and around 3–4% of total tax revenue, with low thresholds and long-established administration.
OECD Revenue Statistics; Swiss Federal Tax Administration statistics.
Limitation
Swiss rates are low (often under 1%) and the tax partly replaces taxes on capital gains, which Switzerland largely does not levy.
Shortfalls are a problem of estimates, not of the tax: revenue projections can include behavioural responses. A tax that raises less than a naive static estimate can still raise a lot.
The UK Wealth Tax Commission estimated a one-off 5% wealth tax above £500,000 per person, paid over five years, would raise about £260 billion after accounting for avoidance and administration costs.
Advani, Chamberlain & Summers (2020). A Wealth Tax for the UK. Final report of the Wealth Tax Commission.
Limitation
A one-off levy, announced as such, avoids the repeated behavioural responses an annual tax faces.
Reported wealth responds to wealth taxation more strongly than reported income responds to income taxation.
Exemptions (for businesses, pensions, farms or homes) erode the base and create avoidance opportunities.
Third-party reporting of assets improves compliance.